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Synonyms
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Definition
The “psychic unity” idea denotes the existence of
a set of psychological and cognitive capacities
universally shared by human beings and grounded
in biological equality.
Introduction
The psychic unity idea assumes that all humans
share cognitive and linguistic capacities that are
grounded in biology and that uniformly underlie
how we relate to one another and to the world we
live in, regardless of differential cultural upbring-
ing. This chapter is divided into three sections. In
the first section, we detail how the idea originates
in ancient Greek philosophy and how throughout
the ages it has spread toward the different socio-
cultural and linguistic disciplines. In the second
part, we discuss how today, researchers in the
cognitive, behavioral, and cultural sciences are
providing a new biological foundation to the
search for human universals. And in part three,
we point toward current debates on the nature and
tenability of the idea of a psychic unity.
History of the Concept
The psychic unity idea, or the idea that there exists
an essential and uniform human nature made up of
shared sensorial and reasoning capacities some-
times rendered with the notions of a “shared
human nature” or “human universals,” has its
roots in ancient Greek philosophy. Subsequently,
it has spread throughout Western philosophical,
religious, and humanist thought where it has been
reinterpreted multiple times over. Common to all
notions of a psychic unity is the adherence to
assumptions on shared cognitive, cultural, and
linguistic capacities which are contrasted from
notions of particularity and relativity of such
capacities.
The Philosophical Origins of the “Psychic
Unity” Idea
Plato (428/427–348/347 BC) and Aristotle
(384–322 BC) are among the first to argue that
all beings have an essence that makes them into
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what they are. On their account, what makes
humans “human” is their intellectual soul that
enables them to reason (Gontier 2009). By mak-
ing use of their reasoning skills, humans are able
to distinguish truths from falsehoods, whereby
falsehoods are “bad” judgments informed by the
use of the senses and truths are “good” judgments
that rely on the use of the intellect. At night, for
example, we falsely “perceive” the objects around
us as black or gray, but we “know” that in truth,
they have colors. But although differences in
judgment occur due to making judgments either
based upon reason or upon the senses, these
thinkers assume that all humans are equipped
with the same reasoning and perceptual capacities
enabling them to make judgments in the first
place.
Early Judeo-Christian thinkers agree that all
human beings are endowed with both intellectual
and instinctive capacities. For them, the intellect is
a divine gift, while instincts are inspired by evil.
Following one’s reason or one’s instincts becomes
a matter of “free will,” and differences in judg-
ment result from choice inspired by faith or lack
thereof.
From the seventeenth century onward, ratio-
nalists such as René Descartes (1596–1650) con-
tinue to endorse that all humans share a “universal
reason” that they receive from a benign god, while
empiricists such as John Locke (1632–1704),
George Berkeley (1685–1753), and David Hume
(1711–1776) introduce the notion of a “common
sense” grounded in a universal way of perceiving
the world through the senses. In so far as differ-
ences in reason exist, these are now understood to
be of a cultural rather than a psychological kind
(Gontier 2006, 3).
The encounter of non-Western nations with
different cultural traditions makes moral philoso-
phers such as Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), Jean-
Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778), and Adam Smith
(1723–1790) distinguish between an individual or
natural state wherein all human beings are equal
and a societal or cultural state wherein linguistic,
social, economic, and political differences exist
(discussed in Gontier 2009). Due to a growing
awareness of natural history, differences between
societies and cultures are subsequently
understood as resulting from an “unequal devel-
opment” of common capacities along a hypothe-
sized gradient of stadial sociocultural
development that mimics the history of Western
society, from hunter gathering over agricultural to
industrial societies (Ingold 2006, 266).
Human Variation in Times of Biological
Racism
In natural history studies and the early biological
sciences, the encounter of non-Western cultural
groups results in early attempts at explaining bio-
logical differences in terms of species variation.
Carl Linnaeus (1707–1778) is one of the first
scholars to divide the human species into five
varieties: “Americans,” “Europeans,” “Asians,”
“Africans,” and “Monsters.” For the last category,
Linnaeus draws upon a combination of false
mythical tales as well as more concrete reports
of humans with birth defects. The first four cate-
gories are based upon variation in physical fea-
tures and geographical location, as well as
assumed cultural temperaments which corre-
sponds to what we would call stereotypes
(Gould 1981).
Differential psychological and cultural traits
thus become understood as biologically innate.
And together with the varied physical appearance
of human groups and their differential geograph-
ical dispersal, these traits become a means to
debate unity and variation within our species.
Scholars are thereby split into two camps.
Georges-Louis Leclerc, Comte de Buffon
(1707–1788), Johann Blumenbach (1752–1840),
and James Cowles Prichard (1786–1848) main-
tain that all humans share a single origin
(monogenism), while Charles White
(1728–1813), Christoph Meiners (1747–1810),
Thomas Jefferson (1743–1826), and Georges
Cuvier (1769–1832) assume that the human spe-
cies can be divided into varieties or “races” that
each have historical origins independent from one
another (polygenism).
In this regard, Charles Darwin (1809–1882),
the founder of evolution theory, claims that behav-
ioral traits and variation thereof are the outcome of
evolution and that all humans share common
descent with modification (monogenesis). But
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Darwin (1871) also endorses the false view that
human varieties can be divided into “races” with
morphological, psychological, and cultural differ-
ences that Darwin (1871) differentiates “races”
morphologically, by different bodily characteris-
tics (what we today call phenotypic differences),
but also psychologically, by assuming differences
in mental capacities and character traits, and cul-
turally, by assuming different levels of “civiliza-
tion.”He furthermore assumes that these traits can
be classified along progressive scales that bear
connotations as going from “inferior” to “supe-
rior”– an idea that is further developed by Ernst
Haeckel (1834–1919) with his biogenetic law.
The Search for Universals in the Rising
Psychological and Cultural Sciences
The biological racism of the eighteenth and nine-
teenth century becomes systematically countered
by rising psychological and anthropological
schools of thought that again reinforce the idea
of a psychic or mental unity among mankind.
Going back to Immanuel Kant’s (1724–1804)
concept of pure reason and Johann Gottfried
Herder’s (1744–1803) idea of historical particu-
larism, Theodor Waitz (1821–1864), Edward
B. Tylor (1832–1917), and the ethnologist Adolf
Bastian (1826–1905) argue for the existence of
universally shared mental capacities (cf. Shore
2000; Jahoda 2013). Bastian (1881), in particular,
distinguishes Elementargedanken or “elementary
ideas” which are universal, fundamental, and
timeless psychological structures whereby all
humans organize experiences, from
Völkergedanken or “folk ideas” which are histor-
ically particular and culture-specific ideas shared
only by members of the same group. The group
therefore has a form of social group mind which
he calls a Gesellschaftsseele.
Franz Boas (1856–1942), father of American
Anthropology and student of Bastian, uses the
idea of a psychic unity of humankind in his long
battle against biological racism. Echoing Rous-
seau, Boas reintroduces the nature-culture divide
and distinguishes between particular cultural tra-
ditions rooted in different histories and universal,
biologically underpinned mental endowment
brought about by biological evolution (Shore
2000, 91–92). Humans are assumed to be biolog-
ically equal in having evolved the same and uni-
versal mental capacities that enable them to
become cultural beings, while particular cultural
traditions result from historical particularities and
contingencies.
Ideas of Psychic Unity in (Anthropological)
Linguistics
Moving forward to the twentieth century, Edward
Sapir (1884–1939) and Benjamin Lee Whorf
(1897–1941), two linguistic anthropologists of
the Boasian school, further couple the doctrine
of psychic unity with ideas on cultural relativism,
and they introduce the latter into the study of
language. While also retaining the idea of biolog-
ical equality in psychological capacities, both
Sapir (1929) and Whorf (1956) argue that the
way wherein people conceptualize knowledge on
the world is always relative to or even determined
by the language they speak, so much so that
languages underlie worldviews or specific views
of the world, a view first introduced by Wilhelm
von Humboldt (reviewed in Foley 1997,
197–201).
Sapir and Whorf’s anthropological ideas on
language also influence the general field of lin-
guistics where, inspired by Eric Lenneberg’s
(1921–1975) notion of a “critical period” wherein
language needs to be learned in order for it to be
within the normal range, Noam Chomsky (1928-)
subscribes to the existence of a biologically
grounded faculty of language. This internal or
I-language is characterized by a universal gram-
mar (UG) and opposed to an external or
E-language that is particular per individual and
language. The former is grounded in biology and
the latter in the language community where one
forms part of.
In the beginning of the twentieth century,
research on universal mental categories would
furthermore start to include taboo concepts, kin-
ship distinctions, color categories, etc. Regarding
color categories, Brent Berlin (1936-) and Paul
Kay (1934-), for example, and by continuing
stage thinking and assuming the existence of lad-
ders of complexity, famously argue that there are
primary and universally shared color categories
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grounded in shared perception and that there is a
nonrandom sequence in which cultures develop
words to express these colors. Such research has
nowadays evolved into the fields of folk
psychology.
The Biological Foundations of the Idea
of Psychic Unity
Today, we know that although humans vary phe-
notypically, we share the same genes, and the
genetic distance between individuals, which is
calculated to be 0,2%, is the same for everyone
(Cavalli-Sforza 2001). In other words, genetic
differences are too minimal to divide the human
species into races, and the different phenotypes
we can distinguish are mere variations of the same
kind of human. The neurological and cognitive
sciences moreover demonstrate that all humans
develop similar brain structures, and all normal
individuals go through similar developmental
stages.
Although there is general agreement on the fact
that humans are endowed with alike cognitive
structures, scholars are currently debating over
which capacities are innate or instinctive and
which are acquired or learned during develop-
ment. On the one hand, instructionists maintain
that our psychological and behavioral dispositions
are acquired over the course of life through learn-
ing. On the other hand, nativists hold that both our
basic physical-biological traits and our psycho-
logical structures are innate (Samet and Zaitchik
2017).
In the cognitive sciences, nativist and
instructionist approaches go hand in hand with
modular and anti-modular or domain-general con-
ceptions of the mind. According to the modular or
“mental organs approach,” introduced by Chom-
sky (1980) and further elaborated by Jerry Fodor
(1983), the mind is made up of many genetically
determined domain-specific modules or mental
organs (Samuels 1998, 577–579; Samet and
Zaitchik 2017, 7). On the other side of the spec-
trum, inspired by Jean Piaget, supporters of the
anti-modular approach endorse that our innate
cognitive capacities are general purpose
(Samuels 1998, 575).
Today, from generative linguistics to univer-
salist cognitive science, from evolutionary psy-
chology to universalist cultural anthropology, a
number of contemporary scholars work under
the assumption of evolved and therefore innate
mental competences to substantiate their univer-
salist claims.
By drawing upon Chomsky’s work on UG,
generative linguists seek to discover “the cogni-
tive (and hence universal) foundations of lan-
guage” (Haspelmath 2012, 92). In doing so, they
maintain that human beings share a distinct “lan-
guage faculty” or “innate specialization for lan-
guage.” On this view, languages differ only
superficially from one another, while on a deeper
and structural level, they share a common set of
syntactic rules.
Contrary to Chomsky, Joseph Greenberg, the
father of linguistic typology, maintains that the
existence of linguistic universals can only be
deduced from the comparative analysis of many
languages. By analyzing the structure of 30 lan-
guages, Greenberg (1963) has demonstrated that
there exist various types of universals, some
“absolute” and some others “statistical.” Among
the former, “unrestricted absolute universals”
appear true of all languages (i.e., all languages
have names and verbs, and all languages have
vowels) and come close to the universals recog-
nized by generative linguists (Evans and Levinson
2009, 437–438).
The idea of a psychic unity of humankind is
also central to evolutionary psychology. Evolu-
tionary psychology propounds a new “coherent
framework for thinking about human nature and
society” (Tooby and Cosmides 2005, 16), by
maintaining that “a scientific definition of human
nature” should focus on “the uniform architecture
of the human mind and brain that reliably
develops in every normal human just as do eyes,
arms, a heart, and so on” (Tooby and Cosmides
1992, 209; quoted in Buller 2005, 428).
Examples are the study of innate or evolved
mental competences in how we read other’s
behavior (folk psychology) or howwe cognitively
classify biological species (folk biology). As Scott
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Atran (1998, 567), who studies folk biology,
explains “taxonomies plausibly represent ‘modu-
lar habits’ of the mind, naturally selected to cap-
ture recurrent habits of the world relevant to
hominid survival in ancestral environments.”
Within this perspective, cognitive universalism
and cultural particularism are ultimately recon-
ciled: a universal system of classification is seen
to underlie the development of different cultural
classification systems. Evolutionary psycholo-
gists, such as David Buss, Leda Cosmides, Martin
Daly, Steven Pinker, Todd Shackelford, Valerie
Starratt, John Tooby, and Margo Wilson, identify
human nature with the idea of a psychic unity of
humankind which they define as “a set of psycho-
logical adaptations that are presumed to be uni-
versal among, and unique to, human beings”
(Downes 2018) (cf. Tooby and Cosmides 2005,
39). On this view, psychological adaptations are
evolved psychological mechanisms (Starratt and
Shackelford 2010, 235) or modules (reviewed in
Downes 2010, 244) that originated between 1.8
million and 10.000 years ago during the Pleisto-
cene Epoch and that helped our ancestors to deal
with a number of adaptive problems (Starratt and
Shackelford 2010, 231–235; cf. Downes 2018).
As Starratt and Shackelford (2010, 232–238)
point out, although such psychological mecha-
nisms evolved to respond to inputs present in
our ancestors’ environment and although such
mechanisms are genetically hardwired and did
not change over the last 10,000 years, their output
is far from being “staunchly predetermined,” as
our behavior is also variously influenced by the
environments that we currently inhabit. Along
these lines, by claiming that individual variation
emerges from “a common nature” attending to
different inputs or circumstances, evolutionary
psychologists find a way to reconcile human
diversity – whether it being cultural, linguistic,
or behavioral – with the idea of a psychic unity
of humankind, that is, the notion of a “universal
human nature” (Buller 2005, 72).
Today, evolutionary psychologists propose
various arguments for the universality of psycho-
logical mechanisms or adaptations. Among
others, Cosmides and Tooby (1997) propose
what David Buller dubs “the argument from
Gray’s Anatomy” and “the argument from sexual
recombination” (Buller 2005, 73). The former
deduces the universality of “selection-designed
psychological traits” from the universal character
of “selection-designed morphological traits,” on
the grounds of the fact that everything, from our
bodies to our minds, has been drafted by selection
(Buller 2005, 73). The latter, on the other hand,
infers the universality of all complex adaptations,
such as psychological adaptations, from the fact
that the genetic basis of adaptation necessarily
imposes “species universality” (Buller 2005,
424). Furthermore, informed by research in cul-
tural anthropology, evolutionary psychologists
reaffirm the intimate connection between the psy-
chic unity idea and an antiracist attitude toward
the study of human behavior. As Tooby and
Cosmides (1992, 38) explain “...models of a
robust, universal human nature by their very char-
acter cannot participate in racist explanations of
intergroup differences. (. . .) Human nature is
everywhere the same.”
Contemporary Debate on the Idea of
Psychic Unity
Contemporary claims on the existence of a psy-
chic unity of humankind have not remained
uncontested. Today, universalist theories about
language, cognition, psychology, and culture
face the criticisms of a number of linguists, cog-
nitive scientists, evolutionary psychologists, as
well as philosophers. Contrasting arguments
about the possibility of delineating the universal
traits of a supposed human nature fuel contempo-
rary debates about the idea of psychic unity, while
some universalist approaches are undergoing a
massive reshaping following the emergence of
new data which demonstrate the existence of con-
siderable crosslinguistic and cross-cultural varia-
tion as well as the nonuniquely human character
of some traits that were previously thought to be
distinctive of our species (Everett 2013, 21).
Today, adherents of generative linguistics cau-
tiously distinguish between a “faculty of language
in the broad sense (FLB)” and a “faculty of lan-
guage in the narrow sense (FLN)” (Hauser et al.
Psychic Unity 5
2002). On this view, whereas FLB can be found in
humans and other species as well, the latter can be
conceived as uniquely human (Hauser et al.
2002, 1578).
Linguistic typologists also use a more tem-
pered language by understanding language uni-
versals as “tendencies,” rather than “strict
universals” or “uncontroversial facts” (Evans
and Levinson 2009, 429–431), i.e., as properties
that are common to many languages and whose
identification necessarily requires to be “non-
aprioristic,” but based on the examination of “a
sufficiently large and reasonably representative
set of languages that have not influenced each
other in recent times” (Haspelmath 2012,
91–99). Within linguistic typology, then language
diversity ceases to be a mere superficial appear-
ance and becomes a fact with “long historico-
cultural roots that explain the many divergences,”
which should be accepted and studied as such
(Evans and Levinson 2009, 432). Such diversity,
as Evans and Levinson (2009, 431) notice, reveals
the centrality of “cultural and technological adap-
tation in our species: language is a bio-cultural
hybrid, a product of intensive gene-culture coevo-
lution over perhaps the last 200,000 to 400,000
years.” In light of this, as language turns out to be
not just a biological product, but also a cultural-
historical artifact, language and its universal ten-
dencies need to be studied from within “a coevo-
lutionary model” (Evans and Levinson 2009,
446). In addition, according to scholars in linguis-
tic typology, the acknowledgement of the impor-
tance of culture for the development of human
language allows one to go beyond the threat of
ethnocentrism and the limitations of nativism that
appear intrinsic to the generativist approach to
linguistic universals (cf. Haspelmath 2012, 99;
Evans and Levinson 2009, 445).
According to Evans and Levinson (2009), the
above arguments have fundamental implications
for the universalist approach to cognitive research
too. In their opinion, the increasing evidence of
structural language differences should lead cogni-
tive scientists to stop searching for cognitive uni-
versals in the wake of generative linguistics and to
develop “a new approach to language and cogni-
tion that places diversity at center stage,” “a
comparative psychology inside our own species
in the central questions that drive cognitive
science” (Evans and Levinson 2009, 429–432).
Some cognitive scientists are already proposing
such a comparative approach to cognitive
research and point to the existence of cross-
cultural variation to challenge nativist approaches
to folk psychology and folk biology (Ravenscroft
2019).
Universalist arguments in evolutionary psy-
chology too have not gone unopposed. David
Buller (2005), Stephen Downes (2010), John
Duprè (2001), David Hull (1986), and Tim Ingold
(2006) have similarly argued that the evolutionary
psychological notion of human nature is untena-
ble as it conflicts with evolutionary biology and
does not take human variation into consideration.
One for all, Buller (2005) puts forward five main
critiques against such notion:
1. Both “the argument from sexual recombina-
tion” and “the argument from Gray’s Anat-
omy” that Cosmides and Tooby (1997)
propose in support of the universality of psy-
chological adaptations are unwarranted (424).
According to Buller, whereas the former can be
rejected on the grounds of the fact that “selec-
tion can, and frequently does, maintain poly-
morphism of complex adaptations within
populations” (424), the latter appears
unsustainable because it rests upon “a ques-
tionable analogy between anatomy and psy-
chology,” among other things (425).
2. The notion of human nature relies on an arbi-
trary distinction between “normality” and
“abnormality,” which finds no support in con-
temporary biological theories (428–438).
3. The idea of human nature is based upon an
essentialist view of species, but Buller shows
that species are individuals, rather than natural
kinds, and hence there cannot be “species-
specific psychological laws” that apply
uniquely to human beings (439).
4. Buller shows that, contrary to what evolution-
ary psychologists hold, the existence of cul-
tural universals does not necessarily
corroborate the idea of a universal human
nature consisting of psychological universals
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(471). This is because psychological universals
are not the only possible mechanisms that lead
to cultural universals. The latter could instead
derive from a number of other processes
(462–471). (In this regard, some of the classic
examples of human universals – Jay
Odenbaugh 2015 cites inbreeding avoidance
and incest taboos, while Rafael Nùñez 2017
refers to numerals – are demonstrably flawed:
they are either too wide ranging to be uniquely
human or too particular to represent universals
of human nature (cf. Odenbaugh 2015, 9).
Moreover, as Ingold 2006, Duprè 2001, and
Nùñez 2017 argue, many of such examples are
fundamentally Western centric. In light of this,
although the psychic unity idea has undoubt-
edly contributed to the affirmation of human
equality against racist claims, such notion
appears to have a fundamental “reverse ethical
significance” (Job 2006), whereby it would
back the West’s presumptions of superiority
up by grounding human universals in Western
principles and values (Ingold 2006, 262–279)).
5. For Buller, once we comprehend the true
import of evolutionary theory, we will see
that “our current adaptations” – whose roots
evolutionary psychologists locate in the Pleis-
tocene period – are “no more definitive of our
‘nature’ than past or future adaptations”
(480) (cf. Downes 2010). In light of current
evolutionary theory, it appears that our adapta-
tions are “no more definitive of our ‘nature’
than nonuniversal adaptations and non-
adaptations” (480).
Whereas Buller (2005), together with Hull
(1986), Duprè (2001), Ingold (2006), and
Odenbaugh (2015), remains skeptical about
human nature, other scholars maintain that it is
still possible to sensibly speak of human nature in
biological terms (for an extensive review of some
of the main arguments for and against the notion
of human nature defended by evolutionary psy-
chologists, see Downes (2018). Among others,
Clark Barrett (2015) proposes to extend the evo-
lutionary psychological notion of human nature to
include human variation (reviewed in Downes
2018). Edouard Machery (2008), on the other
hand, proposes a nomological notion of human
nature, in opposition to an essentialist one. To
Machery (2008, 322), Buller and Hull’s critiques
to human nature invalidate only the essentialist
notion of human nature, which has its roots in folk
biology and which understands human nature as
“the [distinctive] set of properties that are sepa-
rately necessary and jointly sufficient for being
human.” Machery (2008, 323; emphasis ours)
thereby defends a nomological notion of human
nature that interprets human nature as “the set of
properties that humans tend to possess as a result
of the evolution of their species.” According to
Machery (2008, 328), such nomological notion,
and not the essentialist one, corresponds to the
idea of psychic unity espoused by evolutionary
psychologists.
Both Barrett’s and Machery’s theories are not
spared from criticism. Whereas Barrett’s view has
been criticized for being a mere “big list of all the
properties that humans have had and can have”
(Downes 2018), Machery’s has been attacked for
giving rise to a “far more permissive” notion of
human nature than he intended, leaving us won-
dering whether, today, a concept of human nature
is still at all useful (Lewens 2015, 78–79).
Conclusion
Over the centuries, scholars in various disciplines
have contributed to refining the conceptual con-
tours of the psychic unity idea onward and
upward. In so doing, they have sometimes come
to tie it with contrasting theories, such as relativist
and universalist interpretations of human world-
view formation. In spite of the diverse usages of
the psychic unity concept, its advocates have gen-
erally agreed in regarding the existence of uniform
cognitive capacities as a proof of human equality.
Contemporary accounts of human universals,
whether they are cognitive, linguistic, psycholog-
ical, or sociocultural, remain ideas defended by
some and criticized by others in all fields, includ-
ing philosophy, psychology, anthropology, and
linguistics. Proponents newly back up the psychic
unity idea and its inherent ethical dimension by
pointing to a shared evolutionary history, similar
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genetic endowment, alike brain structures, and
common sociocultural values. On the other hand,
some scholars oppose such idea by citing the
radicality of human variability, the threats of
Western-centrism, the limitations of nativism,
and the importance of considering gene/culture
coevolution for understanding human evolution-
ary development.
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